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1. Introduction 
 
In 2008 we faced the starting point of the worst global financial crisis since 
the 1930s. Many financial institutions went bankrupt during the crisis and many 
more would have done so if governments hadn’t bailed them out. Gregory (2010, p. 
xxi) argues that the key driver of the credit crisis was the deficiency of a proper 
evaluation of default probability and credit exposure. Credit risk can be defined as 
the risk of loss stemming from a counterparty failing to fulfill its obligations. It arises 
in almost all financial activities and accounts for the major source of risk for most 
commercial banks (Byström 2005). To not endanger the stability of the financial 
system it is crucial to manage the credit risk exposure of financial institutions. 
One way to evaluate the credit risk exposure is to use credit ratings that 
mirror the creditworthiness of firms. Credit rating agencies have though been 
criticized for being slow to react to market events and too reluctant to downgrading, 
which is why they are seen as one of the key contributors to the financial crisis (Katz, 
Munoz & Stephanou 2009). Another way to assess the credit risk is to use accounting 
based models that are based on historic accounting data, backward looking 
information, which is infrequently updated. Neither of these measures generates 
meaningful interpretations in the sense of probability of default or loss given default 
(Byström 2003). Many people argue it is more forward-looking using marked-based 
indicators such as share price and credit default swap spreads (see for instance Katz, 
Munoz & Stephanou 2009). 
The Merton model is a well-known marked-based model, well used for 
evaluating the credit risk of a company. Since stock market data is used to estimate 
probability of default it is a continuous credit monitoring process that should serve 
as an early warning protection against changing credit quality (Crosbie & Bohn 2003). 
Merton characterizes the firm’s equity and debt as options issued on its assets and 
the probability of default is a function of the firm’s stock price, stock price volatility 
and leverage ratio (Byström 2005). 
The derivatives market grew rapidly in the beginning of the 21st century as 
financial institutions used the derivatives as a way to manage risk (Gregory 2010, p. 
xxi). Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) are the most widely traded kind of credit derivative 
contracts, invented by JPMorgan bankers in the mid-‘90s. The purpose was to hedge 
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and trade credit risk. By removing the risk from the books they were able to free the 
capital reserves kept by federal law. Credit default swaps act like an insurance 
against the risk of a credit event occurring to the underlying entity. The seller 
receives a stream of premium payments, also known as the CDS spread, and is 
therefore obliged to pay the buyer if a credit event occurs (Philips 2008). The value 
of the CDS is hence related to the probability of the reference entity defaulting. The 
spread works as an indicator of distress and a source of information for banks and 
regulators (Weistroffer 2009). 
 With the crisis fresh in mind financial risk management is a hot topic today; 
the implementations of the Basel III regulations have started for the financial firms 
and the non-financial corporations are investing more resources into risk 
management. The credit default swaps have great power in determining the market-
implied probability of default (Simkovic & Kaminetzky 2011), but there is of 
importance for risk managers to understand the drivers behind the risk measure. 
Understanding the determinants of the CDS spreads will help assessing the credit 
worthiness of individual corporations as well as the stability of the whole financial 
system. 
This paper will examine how well the Merton theory can explain the CDS 
premium. We use a streamlined version of the model implemented by Hans Byström 
and apply it on Swedish stock market data. The spread is determined by the 
probability of default of the underlying entity and the Merton model is suggesting 
that this probability is determined by stock price, stock volatility and leverage. The 
purpose of this paper is hence to determine: how well do the Merton-implied 
variables; stock price, stock price volatility and leverage ratio, explain the change in 
the credit default swap spread? 
Using these Merton-implied variables we perform a panel data study of 59 
months for 16 companies1 belonging to the OMX Stockholm equity index. The small 
sample is due to lack of CDS data. To control for company specific and time specific 
variation we include dummy variables for the firms and months.  
                                                        1Assa Abloy, Atlas Copco, Electrolux, Ericsson, Handelsbanken, Investor, Nordea, SCA, Scania, SEB, Securitas, SKF, Swedbank, Swedish Match, Teliasonera, Volvo   
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present 
earlier studies that have covered the subject and how we aim to contribute to this 
literature. After that the theoretical framework is presented followed by data and 
descriptive statistics. Thereafter we declare the methodology and the regression 
model we have chosen. These sections are followed by result and discussion and 
finish off with the conclusion. The appendix is to be found at the end of this paper 
where most of the tables and figures are presented. 
2. Previous research 
 
There have been various researches on this subject before, but there is no 
univocal result. The previous studies are, like ours, based on credit risk pricing 
theories like the Merton model. 
Some studies show a weak correlation between the theory-implied determinants 
and the credit default swaps, while others find the variables have great power in 
determining the premium. Hull, Nelken and White (2004) used credit default swap 
spread data to test whether their proposed alternative Merton model provides a 
superior explanation of observed credit spreads relative to the traditional model. 
This model is using implied volatilities of options issued by the company to estimate 
the parameters. There seems to be a positive relationship between the observed 
spreads and the model predictions stemming from both models, but their proposed 
version outperforms the traditional Merton model. 
Bharath and Shumway (2004) used American stock data to examine how well the 
KMV-Merton model predicts default. They find that the model is only weakly 
correlated with implied default probabilities from CDS spreads. The KMV-Merton 
probability is hence a somewhat useful forecaster of default, but not a satisfactory 
statistic for default. A much simpler model alternative is also proposed which 
performs rather well as a default statistic. 
Afik, Arad and Gali (2012) offered a specification that performs better than the 
one proposed earlier by the two authors in 2008. They tried to enhance Merton’s 
model default probability by comparing the area under the curve of receiving 
operating characteristic and use non-parametric tests to measure statistical 
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difference between these curves. Their conclusion is that a simplified Merton model 
performs better than more complex ones used before them. 
Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2004) also investigated the relationship 
between CDS spreads and theoretical determinants of default risk. These 
determinants were the riskless interest rate, firm leverage and volatility. The 
variables are found to be statistically and economically significant, but depend on 
the econometric method. The explanatory power is larger for the levels of the credit 
default swap premium than for the changes in the premium. 
Abid and Naifar (2006) try to explain the determinants of CDS spreads by 
using variables such as credit rating, maturity, risk free interest rate, slope of the 
yield curve and equity volatility. The majority of these variables, originating in the 
credit risk pricing theories, are significant both statistically and economically, but 
credit rating turned out to be the most determinant of CDS spreads.  
Byström (2005) studies the European iTraxx CDS index market and finds that 
both current and lagged stock returns explain much of the variability in credit default 
swap spreads. CDS spreads tend to widen (narrow) when stock prices fall (rise). The 
stock index return volatility is discovered to be significantly positively correlated with 
the CDS index spreads, indicating the importance of stock volatility for probability of 
default calculations. 
Our contribution to the already existing literature will be a study based on 
Swedish stock market data, to our knowledge this has not been done before. The 
time period covered by the data is highly interesting since it contains observations 
from the recent recession as well as the recovery of the economy. Most previous 
studies on the subject were performed before the great financial crisis.  We provide 
a study based on the streamlined version of the Merton model implemented by 
Hans Byström (2003) and us knowingly this specific implementation has not acted as 
theoretical basis for the credit default swap spread analysis before. 
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3. Theoretical framework 
3.1 Credit risk and default probabilities  
Everyone involved in financial activities is subject to credit risk, i.e. the risk that 
the counterparty fails to fulfill its financial contracts. There is an uncertainty 
surrounding a company’s ability to make the required payments on their debt 
obligations. To compensate lenders and investors for the exposure to default risk, 
firms are charged a rate of return that corresponds to the debtor’s level of default 
risk. The default probability is mainly determined by three elements: Market value of 
assets is a measure of the company’s outlooks and contains relevant information 
about the economy and the firm’s industry. The asset value is an appraisal and has to 
be understood in the context of the business and industry risk; hence the risk of the 
asset value is one of the important elements. It is measured by asset volatility and is 
closely related to the firm size and industry. Lastly there is a measure of the 
magnitude of the firm’s liabilities called leverage. The probability of default increases 
as the book value of debt approaches the market value of the firm’s assets, until the 
firm defaults when the asset value is insufficient to repay the liabilities (Crosbie & 
Bohn 2003). The most well known structural model proposed to estimate the default 
probability is the Merton model (Byström 2005). 
3.2 The Merton model  
In 1974 Robert C. Merton introduced a market-based model to calculate 
probability of default. Merton (1974) expanded the Black and Scholes framework 
from 1973, proposing that option-pricing theory could be used to value corporate 
liabilities. The firms are assumed to have only zero-coupon debt and the company’s 
equity is characterized as a European call option on its assets with a strike price 
equal to the face value of debt. Should the assets be of lower value than the 
liabilities, the call option will not be exercised and the firm will default. Critical 
assumptions for the model to hold are the market for trading the securities is open 
most of the time and the value of the firm, VA, can be explained by equation (1): 
 
𝑑𝑉𝐴 = (𝛼𝑉𝐴 − 𝐶)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑉𝑑𝑧 (1) 
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Where α is the expected rate of return on the firm per unit time and C is the total 
payouts per unit time to shareholders and liabilities-holders. 𝛔 is the volatility of the 
return on the firm per unit time and dz is a standard Gauss-Wiener process. 
 
The value of the equity is given by equation (2): 
𝑉𝐸 = 𝑉𝐴∅(𝑥1) − 𝐵𝑒−𝑟𝜏∅(𝑥2) 
 
where  𝑉𝐸 is the market value of equity, 𝑉𝐴 is the market value of the firm’s assets, B 
is the total amount of the firm’s debt, r is the risk free interest rate, 𝜏 is time to 
maturity of the firm’s debt and ∅ is the standard normal distribution function. 𝑥1 and 
𝑥2 are given by equations (3) and (4). 
𝑥1 = �𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑉𝐴/𝐵] + �𝑟 + 12𝜎𝐴2� 𝜏� /𝜎𝐴√𝜏 
𝑥2 = 𝑥1 − 𝜎𝐴√𝜏 
where 𝜎𝐴 is the asset volatility. 
Equity and asset volatility are related by expression (5) (Byström 2003). 
𝜎𝐸 = 𝑉𝐴𝑉𝐸 ∅(𝑥1)𝜎𝐴 
By solving the non-linear system of equations containing (1) and (5) gives expression 
(6) which is also known as the distance to default. 
𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑛 = �𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑉𝐴/𝐵] + �𝑟 − 12𝜎𝐴2� 𝜏� /𝜎𝐴√𝜏 
The distance to default measures how many standard deviations away from default 
the firm is. The probability of default is hence the probability that the firm value will 
diminish more than the number of standard deviations implied by the distance to 
default. A large distance to default is, by definition, implying a small probability of 
default. 
There have been many modifications of the Merton model over the years; 
one simplification is proposed by Hans Byström (2003). He simplifies the expression 
for the distance to default based on three assumptions. ∅(𝑥1) is assumed to be close 
to one and the drift term �𝑟 − 1
2
𝜎2� 𝜏 is ‘small’ compared to the first term,  
𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑉/𝐵], and is often assumed to be zero. The final assumption is that the default 
barrier is equal to the book value of debt. The leverage ratio, B/V, is hence calculated 
using book value of debt. By assuming that the drift term is equal to zero and making 
(2) 
   (3) 
   (4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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the common assumption that the time to maturity of debt is one year the modified 
expression for distance to default is given in equation (7). 
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑉𝐴/𝐵]/𝜎𝐴 
 
By using equation (5) and the assumption of ∅(𝑥1) being close to one we end up 
with: 
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑉𝐴/𝐵]
𝜎𝐸𝑉𝐸/𝑉𝐴  
Byström defines the leverage ratio as L=B/VA and gets to the simplified expression 
for distance to default: 
𝐷𝐷𝐵𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑟ö𝑚 = log 1 𝐿⁄𝜎𝐸(1−𝐿) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿(𝐿−1) 1𝜎𝐸 
In equation (9) we can see that factors driving the distance to default, and indirectly 
probability of default, are the leverage ratio and the equity volatility. These variables 
will be used in our regression as well as the stock price. The stock prices give an 
indication about the market’s beliefs in the future of the firm. According to Byström 
(2005) there is some evidence of firm-specific information being implanted into 
stock prices before it affects the CDS spreads. 
3.3 Credit Default Swap (CDS)  
A credit default swap is a kind of credit derivative contract designed to transfer 
the credit exposure from one party to another. It works like an insurance contract 
against a default, or another credit event. The CDS purchaser pays a premium to the 
seller until the expiration of the contract; this is compensating the seller for bearing 
the default risk. The amount of payments made per year by the buyer is known as 
the credit default swap spread. In case a credit event occurs before the contract 
matures, the seller is obliged to compensate the CDS buyer and take possession of 
the underlying entity (Yu 2006).  
When the CDSs were introduced by the mid 1990s the market was craving for a 
more flexible risk management tool. The use of credit default swaps to trade and 
hedge credit risk quickly became very popular. By buying a credit default swap the 
credit risk of the reference entity is replaced by the default risk of the CDS seller. This 
usually reduces the credit risk exposure, which means the purchaser can free 
regulatory capital that can be used for more productive investments.  The main 
(8) 
(9) 
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difference between a CDS contract and a regular insurance is that the buyer of the 
credit derivative doesn’t have to own the reference entity. This allows for 
speculation on the credit worthiness of the underlying entity where investors can 
take long or short positions in the CDS according to their opinion on the default risk 
relative to what is implied by the credit default swap spreads (Weistroffer 2009). 
When a protection buyer and seller enter the CDS contract they have to agree on 
an insurance premium. The spread is calculated to cover the expected loss of the 
underlying entity. The probability of default and the recovery rate, i.e. the 
percentage of the face value of debt that can be recovered in event of default, are 
the main parameters that determine the expected loss and therefore also the CDS 
spread. The premium is hence a direct measure of a firm’s credit risk, determined by 
the market (Ibid.). 
4. Data and descriptive statistics  
Data used in our paper work was obtained from Datastream Thomson Reuters, 
we are hence using secondary data. You should always be critical to the validity, but 
we consider the database to be reliable. The variables included in the model are 
collected for a sample of 16 companies that are part of the Swedish OMX equity 
index for a period of 5 years; June 2008 to March 2013 (see Table 1 for descriptive 
statistics).  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable CDS (change in %) and the independent regressors 
leverage ratio, stock price (change in %) and stock price volatility (change in %). Monthly data is used. 
 CDS Leverage ratio Stock return Volatility 
Mean 0.0143 0.5721 0.0103 0.3922 
Median -0.0089 0.5320 0.0148 0.3459 
Std. Dev. 0.1767 0.2765 0.1042 0.2433 
Skewness 3.1305 0.2558 -0.0015 2.2991 
Kurtosis 23.9194 1.9240 6.2372 19.1317 
5th Percentile  -0.1866 0.1677 -0.1671 0.1002 
95th Percentile  0.3011 0.9361 0.1633 0.8274 
Min -0.3881 0.1096 -0.4185 0.0365 
Max 1.7005 1.2469 0.5894 3.0691 
Jarque-Bera 18754.94 55.84 412.18 11067.41 
Correlation with CDS 1 -0.0004 -0.3805 0.1565 
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The credit default swap spreads for firm’s debts with five years to maturity 
and stock prices are selected monthly for each entity. The change (in %) in the 
variables will later on be used in the regression. The reason for choosing credit 
default swaps with five-year maturity is because it is the most liquid market 
(Ericsson, Jacobs & Oviedo 2004). Even so, the CDSs are not continuously traded on a 
daily basis and therefore we use monthly observations instead of daily. 
The monthly changes in % for the CDS spread and stock price is computed by 
subtracting the value from previous month from the value from the present month 
and then dividing it by the value from previous month.  
Δ𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡−1𝑥𝑡−1  
A positive (negative) change in the stock price is expected to decrease (increase) the 
CDS spread. It seems reasonable to believe that the market’s reactions and beliefs in 
the future of the company would affect both the stock market and the CDS market in 
a similar way. 
The monthly equity volatility was estimated using observations of daily stock 
prices: 
𝜎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 = �∑ (𝑥𝑡 − ?̅?)𝑇𝑡(𝑇 − 1)  
where 𝑥𝑡 corresponds to each value within the month, ?̅? is the mean of all values 
within the month and T is the number of trading days in that month. The equity 
volatility is expected to be positively correlated with the CDS spread. A higher 
volatility means more uncertainty, a smaller distance to default and a higher 
probability of default.  
The leverage ratio is collected yearly for the companies and for every year 
the value from the preceding year is used. The leverage ratio was available in 
Datastream and calculated as: 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
where total debt includes all long-term and short-term obligations and total capital 
includes the company’s debt and shareholders’ equity. The leverage ratio gives an 
idea about how a firm finances its operations. A high leverage ratio may indicate 
financial weakness where the cost of this large portion of debt can increase the 
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probability of default. The leverage ratio is hence expected to be positively 
correlated with the CDS spread. 
Our final panel data is comprised of 944 observations for each variable under 
analysis across 59 months for 16 companies that belong to the Swedish market.  
Figure A1 shows the average equity volatility for the companies. Electrolux, 
SKF and Volvo have the highest equity volatility during this time period. The lowest 
monthly volatility is associated with Ericsson, TeliaSonera and Swedish Match. 
 The leverage ratio varies a lot between companies (see figure A2). The four 
banks included in our sample have all high leverage ratios, which is natural for 
financial institutions. Swedish Match though has an equally high leverage ratio. 
5. Methodology 
5.1 Panel data analysis 
 
Data can be analyzed in different ways, commonly by using cross-sectional data, 
time series or panel data. Cross-sectional data refers to observations from different 
subjects at the same point of time while a time series contains observations from 
one subject over time. Panel data combines these, time and space dimensions and is 
beneficial when it comes to studying the effect of changes. You are able to get more 
informative data and efficient econometric estimations (Gujarati & Porter 2009, 
pp.591-592). Using panel data is advantageous since you can get a larger sample, 
greater variation in the independent variables as well as pay regard to heterogeneity 
(Murray 2006, p.679-680).  
The program used to carry all the analysis is R 3.0.0 for 32 bit system with cross 
check in Eviews 7. A part of the code used in R was made available by Oscar Torres-
Reyna (n.d.). 
We start our analysis by visually evaluating the homogeneity of the sampled CDS. 
There might be an identification issue in the case of non-exogenous independent 
variables and heterogeneous estimates (Arellano 2009, p.4). We would like to be 
aware of any possible unobserved factors undertaken by the shocks that might be 
correlated with our explanatory variables; this is known as heterogeneity bias 
(Verbeek 2012, p. 412). We have plotted the heterogeneity of CDS across firms and 
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time with a 95% interval around the mean. By comparing the two graphs we can 
deduct that time effects are more persistent and have higher spikes than the 
individual firm effects. Our preliminary findings could be a good indicator of the 
methods to be used further on into the data modeling. 
To control for heterogeneity between the companies we use ‘the fixed effects 
model’. To pay regard to these company specific characteristics one firm will act as 
the reference company and the other firms will each be assigned a dummy variable. 
By doing this we allow the intercept to vary from company to company, but not over 
time. The individual intercepts, 𝛼𝑖, capture all time-invariant differences between 
the companies. The slope coefficient will still remain the same among the firms. In 
the same way we add a dummy variable for each month, except for one, to control 
for time specific variation. What we get then is a ‘two-way fixed effects model’ 
(Gujarati & Porter 2009, p. 594ff.). 
There are many advantages that come with using the fixed effects model, but 
there are also potential problems to alert. If too many dummy variables are used the 
degrees of freedom diminishes and multicollinearity problems may arise. Identifying 
the effect of variables that do not vary over time can be problematic since the 
company specific intercepts absorb all heterogeneity in the variables (Ibid.).  
Many macro economic and financial variables tend to grow over time without 
returning to an expected value or linear trend. Such a time series is then non-
stationary and may cause spurious regressions. The properties of the OLS estimator 
require for the time series to be stationary. A random variable is weakly stationary if 
its expected value and variance is constant over time and the covariance function 
does not depend on time (Westerlund 2005, pp. 201-207). We carry on the analysis 
by inspecting our data for stationarity, first visually by plotting the four variables 
individually for each of the 16 companies chosen. The data starts from second 
quarter of 2008, during the explosive spread of the financial crisis. As a consequence 
it appears to be a period of higher volatility in the beginning of the series for most of 
the companies that diminish over time. This behavior looks similar with the mean 
reverting process but they seem to wander around the mean rather than increasing 
in mean and volatility that would characterize a random walk. Performing an 
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Augmented Dickey Fuller test confirms we do not have problems with non-stationary 
variables. 
5.2  Models with fixed effects and random effects  
We have chosen to test how well the change in the stock price, change in stock 
price volatility and the leverage ratio affects the change in credit default swap 
spreads. To be able to include all observations in one regression, but still distinguish 
between them, we include dummy variables for companies and time and use a fixed 
effects model.  
 
𝑟𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + �𝛼𝑗𝑁
𝑗=1
𝐷𝑖𝑗 + �𝛼𝑧𝑁
𝑧=1
𝐷𝑡𝑧 + 
 +𝛽𝑠 ∙ 𝑟𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿 ∙ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑉 ∙ 𝑟𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0,𝜎𝑢2) 
 
where r indicates the change (in %), 𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 1 when 𝑖 = 𝑗  and 0 otherwise and 
𝐷𝑡𝑧 = 1 when 𝑡 = 𝑧 and 0 otherwise. 
 
It could also be that there are other variables that affect CDS spreads, which 
are not included in the regression. We could account for them by describing a 
random effects model and assuming that 𝛼𝑖 are the random factors independently 
and identically distributed over companies (Verbeek 2012, p. 381). The model 
becomes: 
 
𝑟𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑠 ∙ 𝑟𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿 ∙ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑉 ∙ 𝑟𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
𝑢𝑖𝑡~(0,𝜎𝑢2);   𝛼𝑖~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0,𝜎𝛼2) 
 
where 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  represent one error term composed of the individual specific 
component,𝛼𝑖, that is constant over time and 𝑢𝑖𝑡which is assumed not to  correlate 
over time. The correlation of the error terms over time is hence accredited to the 
individual components (Verbeek 2012, p. 381). 
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To choose between the two modeling approaches we must look at the 
perspective of inferences we want to draw about the CDS spreads. The fixed effects 
model shows us the expected endogenous variable as conditioned by the 
explanatory variables and the values of 𝛼𝑖  (Verbeek 2012, pp. 384-385). The 
question that arises is whether we want to consider the companies in our sample as 
unique and not randomly drawn from the entire population of companies that can 
be found on the CDS market. We do though restrict our research to the Swedish 
market and companies that serve as entities on the CDS market. Having estimated a 
random effects regression gives us a more general model for companies randomly 
selected, from different fields that bear certain characteristics, from the entire 
population (Ibid.). At this point it might be attractive to choose the random effects 
model for the purpose of extrapolating our findings to the entire Swedish market 
population of companies, but this would be somehow naive given the fact that 𝛼𝑖 
and the vector of variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡  might be correlated leading to inconsistent 
estimators. The fixed effect approach is also to prefer when the number of entities is 
quite small and of a specific nature (Ibid.), like the sample we have. We specify 
different fixed effects models, which we compare with random effects by carrying 
out the Hausman test.  The null is that the errors in the model are not correlated 
with the regressors against the alternative of using a fixed effects specification for 
addressing the correlation problem. We are able to reject the null, concluding that 
using fixed effects will draw better estimates.   
We have chosen to estimate four different models to be able to distinguish 
between the effects of the dummy variables. Model 1 is a simple OLS without any 
dummy variables. In model 2 and 3 we introduce the fixed effects by using Least 
Squares Dummy Variables estimators that are sensible to the individual or time 
specific effects. The fourth model is a two way fixed effects model where both time 
and company dummies are included. 
To estimate a panel data model with the simple OLS we have to impose the 
usual assumptions in order to obtain unbiasness, consistency and efficiency of the 
model. Having unobserved heterogeneity we might find more reliable estimates with 
a fixed effects model that would account for this issue by including individual-specific 
intercepts (Verbeek 2012, pp.373-374). 
 15 
In a multiple regression analysis you want to be able to separate the effect of 
the different variables. To interpret the slope coefficient it has to be under the 
assumption that everything else remains constant, the ceteris paribus condition. In a 
regression analysis we look at the correlation between two variables, but it doesn’t 
tell us in what direction they influence each other. Verbeek (2012, p. 60) states that 
to be able to make a causal interpretation the ceteris paribus condition should 
include all variables, observed and omitted. Due to the small guidance statistical 
tests provide in this matter we should be careful assigning a causal interpretation to 
estimated factors. 
The multiple regression analysis is based on six assumptions. The dependent 
variable can be written as a linear function of an intercept, explanatory variables and 
an error term. To be able to draw conclusions about the model the error term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 
has to be normally distributed. Despite the distribution of the random variables the 
central limit theorem states that as the sample size grows the distribution of the 
population approaches normal distribution. A rule of thumb is that the sample 
should consist of more than 30 observations for the normal distribution to be a good 
approximation of the true distribution (Westerlund 2005, pp. 58-140). Our sample 
well exceeds this limit value, hence we can assume normal distribution. 
The error term has to be homoskedastic, this means to have the same 
variance for all observations. If they show a systematic behavior over the 
observations there is a correlation between the size of the independent variables 
and the scattering of the error terms, this is known as heteroskedasticity. The 
presence of heteroskedasticity can invalidate significance tests and the normal 
variance-covariance-matrix cannot be correctly estimated (Westerlund 2005, pp. 
173-181). We ran a Breusch-Pagan test and rejected the null of homoskedasticity for 
different model specifications.  
The observations have to be independent and have a zero covariance; 
otherwise there is an issue with autocorrelation. Working with time series data, 
where the observations are chronologically ordered over time, it is likely that the 
error term is correlated with its earlier values. The effects of autocorrelation are 
similar to those coming from heteroskedasticity (Westerlund 2005, pp. 185-190). 
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Running the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel models 
we conclude that our sample it is subject to serial correlation. 
Another concern would be cross-sectional dependence (CD) as argued by 
Baltagi (2005, p.197), when one tries to model panel data with cross-section over 
individuals, firms in our case, it is likely to face contemporaneous correlation. For 
this purpose we run a Breusch-Pagan based on Lagrange multiplier test and a 
Pesaran CD test. Under different structural forms the model indicates presence of 
cross-sectional correlation.  
To prevent us from running into biased test results we can relax the 
assumption of independent distributed residuals but which are uncorrelated 
between clusters (Hoeckle n.d.). As it was shown by Arellano (1987) we use a fully 
general structure of the standard errors that account for all of our issues; 
heteroskedasticity, serial- and cross sectional correlation (Croissant & Millo n.d.). 
Another assumption is that the error term has to have an expected value of 
zero. If that is not the case, the OLS estimator is no longer unbiased. This problem 
can arise from leaving out variables that otherwise would have been significant in 
the model. Unexpected signs or sizes of the parameters indicate that a relevant 
variable has been left out (Westerlund 2005, p. 157). 
In a multiple regression you should not be able to predict an explanatory 
variable with a linear combination of the other variables. This phenomenon, called 
multicollinearity, does not affect the predictive power of the model as a whole, but 
you cannot draw inference from individual predictors and it is hard to tell which one 
of them that causes the variation in the dependent variable (Westerlund 2005, pp. 
159-160).  
A goodness-of-fit measure, 𝑅2, shows how well our model explains the variation 
in Y. One drawback with the 𝑅2-measure is that it can never diminish whenever we 
add another variable, even though the extended model might be less accurate. The 
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
2 - measure gets around this problem by punishing for the increasing number 
of variables (Andersson, Jorner & Ågren 2007, p. 94). Since it is not clear how this 
punishment is performed we will use 𝑅2 as our goodness-of-fit measure. You should 
though be aware of the fact that an increasing 𝑅2 partly could be the consequence 
of an increased number of variables in the model. The significance level α is the 
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criterion used for rejecting the null hypothesis; it shows the probability of rejecting a 
true null. We have chosen a 5% significance level throughout the paper.  
6. Result and discussion 
 
Prior to report our results we test for multicollinearity problems by first 
looking at the correlation between the regressors and then by using the variance 
inflation factor (VIF).  The low correlation values (table 2) for our independent variables rules out 
issues with multicollinearity.  
Table 2: Correlation matrix 
Correlation between independent variables, in this context we observe weak relationship between the 
three variables and we rule out multicollinearity. 
 Leverage 
Stock 
return Volatility 
Leverage 1 0.0185 0.0616 
Stock 
return 0.0185 1 -0.1340 
Volatility 0.0616 -0.1340 1 
 
Being guided by the rule of thumb that we might have a collinearity problem 
in case that VIF is greater than 10 (Verbeek 2012, p.45), we acknowledge that the 
result of VIF (see table 3) confirms the absence of a perfect linear relationship in the 
regressors and we can interpret our results. 
Table 3: Variance Inflation factor of independent regressors  
VIF indicates how much the presence of collinearity would increase the variance of the estimated 
parameters from a regression. Generalized VIF is calculated when, in the linear model, the terms have 
more than one degree of freedom. In this case for the two ways fixed effects we have the factors, firms 
and time, and is interpreted as the inflation is size of the ellipse for the parameters of the variables in 
comparison with the case when it would be obtained for orthogonal vectors. We consider a value 
greater than 10 problematic. 
 
GVIF d.f. 𝐆𝐕𝐈𝐅𝟏 (𝟐×𝐝.𝐟.)⁄  
Leverage 33.6491 1 5.8008 
Stock 2.4893 1 1.5778 
Volatility 2.2488 1 1.4996 
 
Our results (see table 2) show that the change in stock price is significant in 
model 1 and 3 (for the second and third model it is significant on the 10%-level). The 
coefficient is consistently negative which means that an increase in the stock return 
has a narrowing effect on the credit default swap spread. This is in accordance with 
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theory where we expected a negative relationship between the change in stock price 
and change in CDS premium. It is also in line with the results Byström (2005) reached 
in the study of the European iTraxx index. We find it rational to suppose that the 
reflections of the market’s beliefs in the future of the company would look the same 
for the stock market and the CDS market. An increasing stock price and a smaller CDS 
premium both indicate positive views on the future and a lower probability of 
default. 
Table 2: Regression results 
We start with a simple OLS that doesn't take the heterogeneity in cross section or over time into 
consideration. In the second model we control for differences in time and the estimated parameters 
indicate how much CDS changes between countries when variables increase with one unit. The third 
model is specified to account for heterogeneity across firms. Estimates show how much CDS changes 
over time, controlling for differences in companies, when the variables increase with one unit for 
leverage, volatility and stock return. The 4th model represents a two ways fixed effect estimated as a 
LSDV (least squares dummy variables) and controls for both time and firms effects, being the model 
with the highest R2. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variables Coefficient          p-value Coefficient        p-value Coefficient        p-value Coefficient        p-value 
Intercept -0.0098                  0.472                (0.0136) 
0.0797                      0.167 
(0.0576) 
0.0812*                   0.059 
(0.0430) 
0.1219*                   0.070 
(0.0671) 
rStock price -0.6211***           0.000 (0.0933) 
-0.1441*                  0.093 
(0.0856) 
-0.5898***              0.001 
(0.0896) 
-0.1404*                 0.100 
(0.0855) 
rVolatility 0.0781***            0.008 (0.0781) 
0.0029                     0.883 
(0.0198) 
0.1226**                 0.010 
(0.0476) 
0.0128                    0.656 
(0.0286) 
Leverage ratio -0.0002                 0.993 (0.0182) 
0.0090                     0.543 
(0.0148) 
-0.3258***             0.002 
(0.1023) 
-0.1265                   0.185 
(0.0954) 
Company dummies   X X 
Time dummies  X  X 
𝑹𝟐 0.16 0.46 0.17 0.47 
Standard errors within parenthesis 
*   Significance level 10% ; ** Significance level 5%; *** Significance level 1% 
  
In model 1, additionally to stock return, volatility was also significant with a 
positive slope coefficient. This result is in accordance with the Merton model where 
a higher leverage ratio gives a smaller distance to default, which in turn indicates a 
higher probability of default. In many of the previous studies this positive correlation 
was also detected. The stock volatility implies uncertainty and that seems like a valid 
reason to increase the CDS premium. Leverage ratio is not significant in this first 
model. The R2 is very low (0.16), which indicates there are more things that explain 
the credit default swap spread than the included variables. 
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In model 2 we expanded the model by including dummy variables for time. Many 
of them are significant and the R2 measure rose to 0.46 showing there are time 
specific differences that explain a fair part of the change in the CDS spread. The time 
dummies control for time specific factors that affect all firms during a certain month, 
such as the trade cycle. Since our sample includes observations from the recession as 
well as the time of recovery of the economy it appears reasonable to get a significant 
contribution from the dummies. Other than the dummy variables there are no 
variables that are significant on the 5%-level. The stock return is significant on a 10 % 
level with a negative coefficient. This indicates that CDS spread changes negatively 
by 0.14% from a company to the other controlling by differences in time, when stock 
return increases by 1%. Volatility has a positive slope coefficient but is far from 
significant in this model. It might be that the time dummies absorb the effect of the 
stock price volatility. Since the volatility was higher for all firms during the financial 
crisis, the variable is hence time dependent. Leverage ratio is not significant in this 
model either. 
In model 3 we exchange the time dummies for company dummies to control for 
firm specific factors that do not vary over time. Most of the firm dummies are 
significant and so are the three regressors. This allows us to say that CDS decreases 
by 0.58% over time, controlling by differences in firms, when stock return increases 
by one percentage. In the same way controlling by differences in companies, CDS 
increases with approximate 0.12% when volatility increases by one unit. Those 
variables take on the expected signs, but the leverage ratio has a negative slope 
coefficient, which is the contrary to what is expected according to theory. This is also 
the only model where leverage ratio is significant at all. There might be an issue with 
this variable stemming from the great differences in leverage ratio between financial 
firms and non-financial firms. The company dummies help to account for the 
differences between the firms, but the unexpected sign might be due to the fact that 
the financial firms have a high leverage ratio but still are stable companies. The R2 is 
only 0.17 for this third model, the firm specific factors do not seem to explain as 
much of the change in the CDS spread as the time specific ones did.  
In models 2 and 3 the intercept represents the estimated parameter of the 
excluded group from the regression, for companies and date groups respectively and 
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we can test overall differences among the firms and different periods that the OMX 
companies went through. For the third model this structural form allows us to 
compare different companies with the reference point, which in our case is Assa 
Abloy. Therefore we take the intercept as being its estimate coefficient and we 
compare every company to it. However in the case of model 3 the intercept is not 
significant. Looking at the dummies we observe that there are around eight 
companies, mostly financial firms, which differ significantly from Assa Abloy. This is 
consistent with the leverage ratios of the companies taken into consideration. Our 
regression is able to show significant difference between the benchmark and the 
highly leveraged companies like Handelsbanken, Nordea and SEB. 
In the fourth model we include all variables and get an R2 of 0.47, which is very 
close to the goodness-of-fit measure for model 2 (0.46). There are still other 
variables that explain the CDS spread that are not included in the model. In this 
fourth model the majority of the time dummies are significant, but among the firm 
dummies only one is significant. Neither of the explanatory variables are significant, 
but just as in model 2 the stock return is significant at the 10% level with the 
negative slope coefficient as suggested by theory. Volatility is once again positively 
correlated with the CDS spread, but not significant. It seems to be that in the models 
where we have included dummy variables for time, volatility is not significant. The 
significance for the change in the stock price is also lowered in these models 
indicating that the time dummies absorb some of the explanatory power from the 
variable. The leverage ratio was not significant here either. Since the data for 
leverage ratio only is provided yearly there are only five different values for each 
company and it might therefore not be the best specification of the variable because 
of the infrequent updating. On the other hand, the companies’ financing methods 
rarely change quickly. 
To determine which of these four models is the best one we perform a set of F-
tests. We conclude that model 2 is the best model of the four we estimated. The 
tests can be found in table 5 on the following page. 
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Table 5: F-test for comparing nested models 
We use the F-test to compare the four nested models we have by looking at their residual sum of 
squares. We investigate whether the computed RSS will change significantly by adding additional 
terms. Model 2 turns out to be the best one. 
 The F-statistic is computed like follows:  𝐹 = (𝑅12 − 𝑅02)/𝐽(1 − 𝑅12)/(𝑁 − 𝐾) (Verbeek 2012, p. 67)        𝑅𝑖2 − 𝑅𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠  
        𝐽 − 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁 − 𝐾 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚  
 
Models 1 vs. 2 1 vs. 3 3 vs. 4 2 vs. 4 
F-test 8.6854 1.2775 8.2755 0.5387 
p-value 0.000 0.2093 0.000 0.9196 
 
 
Model 2 turns out to be the best model we have estimated. We can conclude 
then that no explanatory variables turned out to be significant according to the 
significance level we chose and time specific factors play a great role in determining 
the change of the CDS spread. This makes sense considering the uncertainty and 
cautiousness associated with recessions. Where we are in the business cycle should 
affect the premium demanded by the CDS seller to take on the risk of a credit event 
occurring. The stock return and the CDS spread are both indicators of the beliefs of 
the market, a negative correlation between them was to expect. 
In the second model we used the individual time effects to account for specific 
influences across the time periods included in the panel data. The intercept 
represents the estimate of the first period from our sample which was excluded 
from the dummies and represents the baseline to which we rapport the others. The 
coefficients of the rest of the months are compounded as differences from the 
intercept of the regression. As we observed through the carried test before, in our 
modeling strategy the time-specific effects are quite important and statistically more 
significant than individual effects. It can be seen that the last quarter of 2008 
accounts positively for the percentage change in CDS spread while the ongoing 
period has a negative influence towards the change. An interesting analysis might 
arise if we consider a business cycle pattern that the CDS spread follows. There are 
times with economic growth and crisis that affect all companies, more or less. From 
the end of 2008 up until the first quarter of 2010 almost all months show 
significance for the CDS spread differences, after that it gets a bit more mixed up 
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with non-significance. The recent financial crisis seems to have had an impact on the 
credit default swap premiums. In table A1 a full version of the regression results can 
be found, with dummy variables included. 
The Merton model is based on a number of assumptions; the firms only have 
zero-coupon debt and the equity is viewed as a European call option on the assets of 
the firms. The simplified version we use has an additional three postulations.  This 
might not mirror reality very well, but the Merton model is well used and we wanted 
to try the performance of a streamlined version. Previous researches have multiple 
times shown that simplified models perform as well as the original model, and 
sometimes even better. If we have excluded essential variables from the model the 
error term no longer has an expected value of zero and the results are not valid. 
Something else that could be an issue is reversed causality, we only look at 
correlation, not in which direction the variables affect each other. The model is 
though based on economic theory. 
Maybe we could have gotten better results by excluding the financial firms from 
our sample because of their special characteristics. That would be a proposal for 
future studies on the subject. We already have a small sample of companies in our 
study though, restrained by the lack of Swedish companies represented on the CDS 
market. Having a larger sample might as well have improved our analysis. The minor 
sample also means the results cannot be generalized for all companies belonging to 
the Stockholm OMX equity index. 
7. Conclusion  
The purpose of this paper was to examine how well the Merton-implied 
variables stock price, stock price volatility and leverage ratio affect the CDS spread. A 
panel data study has been conducted with a streamlined Merton model as 
theoretical framework. We have reached the conclusion that the structural model 
alone cannot explain the change in credit default swap spreads. The stock return 
gave a significant negative impact on the change of the premium (on the 10% level 
for two models). The change in volatility turned out to be significant with a positive 
coefficient in the models where time dummies were not included. Both of these 
variables have expected signs according to theory. Leverage ratio was only 
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significant in the model with company dummies, it took on a negative value which 
was not in accordance with theory. The most determinant of the spread was the 
time specific variation. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1: Average monthly equity volatility 
Monthly equity volatility calculated as an average for the period June 2008 - April 2013. The monthly 
equity volatility is calculated from daily stock prices: 
 𝜎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 = �∑ (𝑥𝑡−?̅?)𝑇𝑡(𝑇−1)   
where 𝑥𝑡corresponds to each value within the month, ?̅? is the mean of all values within the month and 
T is the number of trading days in that month. All 16 companies from our sample are represented. 
 
 
Figure A2: Average leverage ratio for companies included in the sample 
The leverage ratio is collected yearly and the value from the preceding year is used. The leverage 
ratio is calculated as total debt over total capital; where total debt includes long-term and short-
term obligations and total capital consists of company’s debt and shareholder’s equity. 
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Table A1: Regression result, Arellano standard errors 
 We start with a simple OLS that doesn't take the heterogeneity in cross section or over time into 
consideration. In the second model we control for differences in time and the estimated parameters 
indicate how much CDS changes between countries when variables increase with one unit. The third 
model is specified to account for heterogeneity across firms. Estimates show how much CDS changes 
over time, controlling for differences in companies, when the variables increase with one unit for 
leverage, volatility and stock return. The 4th model represents a two ways fixed effect estimated as a 
LSDV (least squares dummy variables) and controls for both time and firms effects, being the model 
with the highest R2. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Estimate Std. error p-value Estimate 
Std. 
error p-value 
Estimate Std. 
error p-value 
Estimate Std. 
error p-value 
(Intercept) -0.0098 0.0136 0.4719  0.0797 0.0576 0.1669  0.0812 0.0430 0.0591 . 0.1219 0.0671 0.0696 . 
Leverage -0.0002 0.0182 0.9928  0.0090 0.0148 0.5431  -0.3258 0.1023 0.0015 ** -0.1265 0.0954 0.1853  
rStock -0.6211 0.0933 0.0000 *** -0.1441 0.0856 0.0925 . -0.5898 0.0896 0.0000 *** -0.1404 0.0855 0.1006  
rVolatility 0.0781 0.0295 0.0082 ** 0.0029 0.0198 0.8832  0.1226 0.0476 0.0102 * 0.0128 0.0286 0.6558  
Atlas Copco         0.0351 0.0321 0.2740  0.0089 0.0295 0.7623  
Electrolux         -0.0139 0.0298 0.6408  -0.0074 0.0266 0.7798  
Ericsson         -0.0447 0.0350 0.2020  -0.0268 0.0299 0.3701  
Handels-
banken         0.1743 0.0712 0.0145 * 0.0806 0.0670 0.2295  
Investor         -0.0684 0.0341 0.0453 * -0.0298 0.0283 0.2920  
Nordea         0.1968 0.0658 0.0028 ** 0.0750 0.0626 0.2306  
SCA         0.0269 0.0303 0.3747  0.0084 0.0285 0.7693  
Scania         0.0885 0.0467 0.0587 . 0.0441 0.0445 0.3225  
SEB         0.2134 0.0686 0.0019 ** 0.0799 0.0652 0.2213  
Securitas         0.1064 0.0402 0.0083 ** 0.0388 0.0397 0.3289  
SKF         -0.0057 0.0321 0.8589  -0.0009 0.0284 0.9761  
Swedbank         0.1760 0.0664 0.0081 ** 0.0608 0.0653 0.3527  
Swedish 
Match         0.2080 0.0768 0.0069 ** 0.0798 0.0741 0.2821  
Teliasonera         0.0176 0.0296 0.5529  -0.0083 0.0285 0.7718  
Volvo         0.1290 0.0541 0.0173 * 0.0689 0.0514 0.1799  
Jul-08     0.1275 0.0737 0.0839 .     0.1286 0.0736 0.0810 . 
Aug-08     -0.0900 0.0606 0.1381      -0.0885 0.0612 0.1488  
Sep-08     0.1700 0.0910 0.0619 .     0.1706 0.0920 0.0641 . 
Oct-08     0.3320 0.1542 0.0316 *     0.3306 0.1537 0.0317 * 
Nov-08     0.0942 0.1063 0.3754      0.0944 0.1073 0.3790  
Dec-08     0.1345 0.0788 0.0882 .     0.1357 0.0791 0.0865 . 
Jan-09     -0.2457 0.0570 0.0000 ***     -0.2419 0.0571 0.0000 *** 
Feb-09     -0.0969 0.0627 0.1227      -0.0931 0.0638 0.1445  
Mar-09     0.0417 0.0718 0.5613      0.0459 0.0725 0.5274  
Apr-09     -0.2106 0.0715 0.0033 **     -0.2074 0.0724 0.0042 ** 
May-09     -0.2803 0.0688 0.0000 ***     -0.2755 0.0684 0.0001 *** 
Jun-09     -0.0785 0.0689 0.2545      -0.0728 0.0696 0.2956  
Jul-09     -0.1364 0.0588 0.0206 *     -0.1342 0.0589 0.0230 * 
Aug-09     -0.2514 0.0629 0.0001 ***     -0.2476 0.0632 0.0001 *** 
Sep-09     -0.1771 0.0654 0.0069 **     -0.1718 0.0670 0.0105 * 
Oct-09     -0.1343 0.0600 0.0255 *     -0.1291 0.0613 0.0356 * 
Nov-09     -0.1270 0.0592 0.0321 *     -0.1221 0.0598 0.0417 * 
Dec-09     -0.1139 0.0598 0.0570 .     -0.1077 0.0611 0.0785 . 
Jan-10     -0.1638 0.0587 0.0054 **     -0.1610 0.0592 0.0066 ** 
Feb-10     0.0982 0.0623 0.1154      0.1011 0.0626 0.1067  
Mar-10     -0.1514 0.0581 0.0093 **     -0.1488 0.0587 0.0115 * 
Apr-10     -0.1151 0.0571 0.0443 *     -0.1133 0.0573 0.0482 * 
May-10     0.0189 0.0557 0.7343      0.0205 0.0558 0.7133  
Jun-10     -0.0227 0.0602 0.7065      -0.0208 0.0607 0.7312  
Jul-10     -0.1150 0.0573 0.0451 *     -0.1136 0.0572 0.0476 * 
Aug-10     -0.1107 0.0660 0.0936 .     -0.1088 0.0666 0.1029  
Sep-10     -0.0624 0.0596 0.2954      -0.0604 0.0601 0.3151  
Oct-10     -0.1335 0.0585 0.0227 *     -0.1309 0.0590 0.0269 * 
Nov-10     -0.1162 0.0600 0.0530 .     -0.1130 0.0609 0.0636 . 
Dec-10     -0.0752 0.0586 0.2001      -0.0727 0.0594 0.2215  
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Estimate Std. error p-value Estimate 
Std. 
error p-value 
Estimate Std. 
error p-value 
Estimate Std. 
error p-value 
Jan-11     -0.0931 0.0604 0.1240      -0.0940 0.0614 0.1257  
Feb-11     -0.1382 0.0568 0.0151 *     -0.1385 0.0572 0.0156 * 
Mar-11     -0.0727 0.0552 0.1881      -0.0736 0.0552 0.1827  
Apr-11     -0.0802 0.0575 0.1637      -0.0814 0.0574 0.1565  
May-11     -0.0948 0.0569 0.0962 .     -0.0949 0.0575 0.0992 . 
Jun-11     -0.0388 0.0548 0.4789      -0.0410 0.0546 0.4525  
Jul-11     0.0072 0.0606 0.9059      0.0043 0.0604 0.9431  
Aug-11     0.1676 0.0640 0.0089 **     0.1650 0.0632 0.0092 ** 
Sep-11     0.0962 0.0609 0.1148      0.0945 0.0609 0.1213  
Oct-11     -0.0553 0.0593 0.3513      -0.0585 0.0585 0.3177  
Nov-11     -0.0782 0.0557 0.1612      -0.0805 0.0557 0.1485  
Dec-11     -0.0480 0.0613 0.4334      -0.0486 0.0618 0.4314  
Jan-12     -0.1567 0.0620 0.0117 *     -0.1543 0.0624 0.0137 * 
Feb-12     -0.1784 0.0669 0.0078 **     -0.1752 0.0686 0.0108 * 
Mar-12     -0.1889 0.0571 0.0010 ***     -0.1856 0.0578 0.0014 ** 
Apr-12     0.0068 0.0600 0.9093      0.0101 0.0600 0.8662  
May-12     -0.0080 0.0592 0.8923      -0.0056 0.0584 0.9236  
Jun-12     -0.1104 0.0596 0.0644 .     -0.1073 0.0607 0.0775 . 
Jul-12     -0.0797 0.0589 0.1768      -0.0770 0.0587 0.1898  
Aug-12     -0.1713 0.0595 0.0041 **     -0.1681 0.0605 0.0056 ** 
Sep-12     -0.2050 0.0586 0.0005 ***     -0.2017 0.0588 0.0006 *** 
Oct-12     -0.0736 0.0594 0.2159      -0.0703 0.0600 0.2414  
Nov-12     -0.0611 0.0569 0.2834      -0.0570 0.0577 0.3233  
Dec-12     -0.1453 0.0610 0.0174 *     -0.1411 0.0624 0.0239 * 
Jan-13     -0.1095 0.0569 0.0546 .     -0.1060 0.0576 0.0661 . 
Feb-13     -0.0536 0.0579 0.3554      -0.0510 0.0580 0.3796  
Mar-13     -0.0983 0.0583 0.0920 .     -0.0945 0.0591 0.1103  
Apr-13     -0.0909 0.0563 0.1069      -0.0894 0.0558 0.1090  
R -squared  0.1562    0.4629    0.1733    0.4679   
F-statistic  59.99    12.46    10.77    10.03   
P-value  0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   
Standard errors : 
‘.’ Significance level 10%       ‘*’   Significance level 5%    ‘**’ Significance level 1%       ‘***’ Significance level 0.1% 
Table A1: Regression result, Arellano standard errors (continues)  
